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ABSTRACT 
In the practical use of security mechanisms such as CAPTCHAs 
and spam filters, attackers and defenders exchange ‘blows,’ each 
celebrating (temporary) success in breaking and defending.  We 
are interested in the question of whether the order in which 
defensive algorithms are released has a significant impact on the 
time taken by attackers to break the combined set of algorithms.  
The rationale behind our approach is that attackers learn from 
their attempts, and that the release schedule of defensive 
mechanisms can be adjusted so as to impair that learning 
experience.  This paper introduces this problem.  We show that 
our hypothesis holds for an experiment using several simplified 
but representative spam filter algorithms—that is, the order in 
which spam filters are released has a statistically significant 
impact on the time attackers take to break all algorithms.  We then 
model the problem as an optimization problem using a Markov 
Decision Process model.  We present a tailored optimization 
algorithm to obtain efficiently the optimal release strategies for 
any given model.   
Categories and Subject Descriptors 
D.4.6 [Operating Systems]: Security and Protection – access 
controls, authentication; 
General Terms 
Algorithms, Design, Reliability, Experimentation, Security 
Keywords 
Spam, CAPTCHA, Learning, Optimization 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The primary purpose of the security algorithms that are 
considered in this paper is to protect system resources from 
misuse.  The algorithms encode a set of rules that characterize this 
misuse, and prevent any adverse effect on system resources.  
Examples of such algorithms include spam-filters, CAPTCHAs 
and Anti-Phishing solutions.  As attackers interact with the 
system, they receive feedback that augments their knowledge of 
the rules used by the system to characterize misuse.  Accordingly, 
they are able to adapt their future interactions in accordance with 
this augmented knowledge, increasing their ability to break the 
defensive algorithms.  
As observed in [2], when a new attack is successful, knowledge of 
this attack is distributed to potential attackers.  This algorithm will 
then be useless in protecting the system from misuse. A 
replacement defensive algorithm is needed. This raises the 
following question: can we help the developer and planner of the 
defensive algorithms?  For instance, could it be useful to break up 
one defensive algorithm into multiple algorithms, and release 
them one by one?  Or could it be useful to reorder the release of 
the various algorithms to maximize the overall time taken by the 
attacker to break all algorithms? 
The main hypothesis behind our work is that the time taken to 
break a set of defensive algorithms depends on what the attacker 
has learned from earlier successful attacks on algorithms.  
Moreover, we hypothesize that we can influence the learning done 
by the attacker by the way we order the release of the defensive 
algorithms.  In this paper we formulate and solve the optimization 
problem based on both of these issues.   
To research this problem we first test that the hypothesis is 
correct, or at least demonstrate it is believable.  For that reason, 
we conduct an experiment with simplified but representative spam 
filter algorithms.  We ask two groups of twenty subjects to break 
these algorithms, where the algorithms are presented in a different 
order to the respective groups.  The experiment shows that there is 
a statistically significant difference in the time taken by the two 
groups to break the algorithms.  So, it confirms the hypothesis that 
the total time for an attack to succeed depends on the order in 
which defensive algorithms are released (or, to be more precise, 
the hypothesis is not rejected [16]).  
Our second contribution is to provide an optimal strategy for the 
release of defensive algorithms.  Our approach to this task is to 
mathematically model the optimization problem, and to present a 
bespoke efficient solution algorithm that derives the optimal 
release strategy for any model.  Our model is a Markov Decision 
Process model, with a specific state space that we utilize to derive 
the efficient optimization algorithm.  
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to address this 
particular issue of optimizing the release strategy to delay the 
attack success as long as possible.  There exists a considerable 
amount of related work that considers the attack and defense 
interaction as a game-theoretic problem, but these formulations do 
not fit exactly with our approach.  In particular, the existing 
literature does not explicitly represent learning in the model. It 
also typically does not consider maximizing the duration of the 
game as the objective, but aim for Nash or other equilibria.  This 
does not fit our perspective of finite sets of algorithms that need 
scheduling. (We refer to Section 7 for a further discussion of 
related work.)   
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes 
the system model that forms the basis of our experimental study 
and our derivation of optimal release strategies.  Section 3 
describes the experimental study, and its results are presented in 
Section 4.  Our approach to the derivation of optimal release 
strategies is presented in Section 5.  The discussion is presented in 
Section 6. Section 7 discusses related work. Finally, we conclude 
with overall discussions and future work in Section 8.  
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2. SYSTEM MODEL 
In order to describe our approach, we start by providing an 
abstract system model of the attack scenario, involving the 
attacker and the system as shown in Figure 1.  This model 
provides the basis of the experimental study that we present in 
Section 3, and is refined into a stochastic model in Section 5 to 
derive optimal release strategies. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. System Model 
 
The aim of the system model in Figure 1 is to describe a general 
class of security solutions which include CAPTCHAs, certain 
spam filters, intrusion tolerance algorithms, etc.  This class of 
mechanisms is characterized by an intelligent defensive algorithm 
being attacked and eventually broken, and then being replaced by 
a new intelligent defensive mechanism, etc.  In the system model 
we assume a finite set of resources that can be used, e.g. 
communication or computation resources.  A security layer is 
deployed to protect the system resources from misuse, e.g. high 
consumption or consumption for unacceptable purposes.  The 
security layer contains a pool of algorithms.  These algorithms 
classify requests to the system as acceptable or unacceptable 
based upon a set of rules.  A request that is classified as 
acceptable can proceed through the security layer and use system 
resources.  If a request is classified as acceptable then the request 
proceeds and the system resources are consumed.  A request that 
is classified as unacceptable cannot proceed through the security, 
and feedback is provided to the user regarding the failed request. 
An attacker is an agent (human or computational) that attempts to 
misuse system resources.  The attacker makes requests for the 
system resources, which pass through the security layer as 
described above.  The attacker has some prior knowledge about 
the rules used to classify request, and attempts to structure his 
requests to be classified as acceptable.  On each failed attempt, the 
attacker receives some feedback from the system.  This feedback 
may be a simple Boolean response, or may include reasons for the 
failure.  The attacker can add this feedback to his knowledge, and 
use this knowledge to inform his subsequent requests.  By 
repeatedly performing this knowledge acquisition process, the 
attacker can derive the rules that are used by algorithms to classify 
requests.  This includes both the parameters used, and the values 
of these parameters.  The attacker can then misuse system 
resources by sending requests that are structured in such a way 
that they fulfill the rules of the algorithm in the security layer. 
Therefore, to maintain the security of the system, the security 
layer must be periodically updated.  Within this update, the 
algorithm used by the security layer is replaced by another 
algorithm from the pool to encapsulate a different set of rules such 
that requests that are misusing system resources are no longer 
permitted to pass through the security layer. The attacker must 
repeat the process of knowledge acquisition in order to determine 
the new classification rules, such that he can continue sending 
requests to misuse system resources.  This process of learning 
takes time and the overall aim of the algorithms is to maximize 
the time until all are broken. 
The order in which algorithms are released may thus be important.  
The more time it takes for the attacker to acquire the necessary 
knowledge regarding classification, the longer the system is 
protected from misuse.  For instance, in the pool of algorithms 
that can be selected, there may exist algorithms that have some 
overlapping or similar rules. The question for the defender then is 
in what order to release these algorithms so that the time until all 
algorithms are broken is maximized.   
3. EXPERIMENTAL STUDY: SPAM-
FILTER ALGORITHMS 
In order to test the hypothesis that the time spent on breaking 
some defensive algorithms depends on what the attacker has 
learned from earlier successful attack algorithms, and that we can 
influence the learning done by the attacker by the way we order 
the release of the defensive mechanisms, we conducted a 
controlled laboratory experiment in which subjects were asked to 
break a set of three specifically created spam-filter algorithms. 
3.1 Experiment Setup  
The experiment involves subjects to act as potential attackers 
carrying out attacks on a test system, within which a number of 
different security algorithms have been deployed.  Specifically, 
the attackers are asked to formulate and dispatch spam messages 
through a mail server, on which different spam-filter algorithms 
were deployed.  When the attackers collect sufficient knowledge 
to adapt their interactions and misuse the system and dispatch 
their spam messages, the spam-filter algorithms are replaced and 
the attackers are told to continue their attacks.  The time taken for 
the attackers until they are able to misuse the system under 
different spam-filter algorithms was collected.  The algorithms 
were presented to two different groups of subjects in different 
order, and we recorded the time and attempts taken to break the 
algorithms. Based on these data points we determine whether 
there is a significant difference in the time taken between the 
groups.  Moreover, this enables us to determine whether or not the 
time taken to misuse the system is dependent on the order in 
which the algorithms are deployed.   
3.1.1 Experiment Design  
In order to evaluate the time needed to break the algorithms, we 
decided to use a between-subjects design. This type of design 
requires more participants but ensures that the exact same 
algorithms are used in each experiment condition, and that there is 
no unnecessary confounding factor biasing the results. The main 
independent variable for this experiment is the algorithm order.  
The time consumed to break each algorithm and the numbers of 
trails are the dependent variables.   
The participants are randomly assigned to one of the following 
two experimental groups:  
 Ascending Group (G1): The order of algorithms for this 
group was: A1, A2 then A3. 
 Descending Group (G2): The order of algorithms for 
this group was A2, A1 then A3. 
Given these two experimental groups, our hypothesis was: 
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H1 – The time taken to break a series of algorithms is 
dependent on the order in which the algorithms are released. 
We expain the rationale behind the three algorithms and their 
ordering in the respective groups in more detail in Section 3.1.4. 
3.1.2 Attackers 
A nontrivial problem was to find potential attackers.  The aim was 
attackers that could be considered to be non-specialists.  Whilst 
specialist attackers or security experts could have been recruited, 
they would give us information mostly about where and how our 
particular algorithms needed to be improved and less about 
learning.  Forty students were recruited for this experiment (34 
male and 6 female, something we did not consider relevant for our 
experiment). The typical age range of subjects was 24-33 with 4 
participants in the group 40+.  The subjects of this experiment 
were 40 master and PhD students from the School of computing 
science and other schools in Newcastle University.  37 subjects 
have technical backgrounds (majoring in computer science and 
engineering), and the remaining 3 subjects non-technical (in 
linguistics).  A brief instructions page was shown at the beginning 
of the experiment to explain the basics of how to breach a spam 
filter.  The participant could view the same instructions again at 
any moment during the experiment.  This step was necessary to 
minimize the results bias by insuring that all participants are 
starting from a common knowledge background.  
3.1.3 System 
A challenge in designing the experiment is to design a system that 
can be breached by ordinary people in a matter of minutes. We 
found that spam filters could offer a very good model for our 
experimental requirements. Although we do not claim or attempt 
to study and derive results for spam filters themselves, we do 
believe the simple spam filters we consider have enough 
similarities with reality to act as an example of the class of 
systems we introduced in Section 2.  
Modern spam filters [17] work by recording hashes from each 
message being sent through the mail server.  If a new message has 
a certain percentage of hashes similar to a previously recorded 
message, the new message would be considered as similar to the 
previous one.  If then a similar message have been found more 
than a certain number of times, it is considered as spam.  The 
server would then delete any new message that is sufficiently 
similar. 
To try to break spam filters, one can use simple writing 
techniques, such as random letter additions, thesaurus 
substitutions, or whitespace injection.  When applied to a 
message, these techniques result in different hashes and, hence, 
trick the spam filter into thinking that this message is not similar 
to an old (spam) message.  Our experiment evaluates how quick 
subjects find out how to edit messages so that it defeats the spam 
filter algorithm.  
We developed a web-based system on which to perform the 
experiment.  A Web application called SpamDefender was 
developed, which enables each participant to perform a 
registration process (e.g. choosing a username, password and 
educational background), sign a consent form, and read a brief 
introductory page that includes an explanation about the necessary 
information (e.g. description of the experiment, experiment 
factors, the participant goal, applied method on how to defeat a 
content-based spam-filter).  The participant could then begin the 
experimental process, interacting with the spam-filter algorithms. 
The proposed algorithm in [17] was chosen as the base to 
implement three different, but related, algorithms that are based 
on the core idea of comparing hashes similarities.  We note that 
this algorithm has been demonstrated to have a 98% recall rate 
and 100% precision by using an unsupervised learning engine.  
3.1.4 Algorithms 
The rationale behind our spam filter algorithms is as follows.  A 
simple algorithm A1 acts as base algorithm, and a more 
complicated algorithm A2 extends the rules used by A1.  In other 
words, the rules in A1 are a subset of A2.  Intuitively, if we 
release algorithm A1 before A2, one could argue that the attackers 
learn from A1 to break A2, and therefore break the two algorithms 
together quicker.  One could also argue that the learning from A1 
may distract from breaking A2, for instance if the attacker does 
not realize the similarity or (conversely) becomes preconditioned 
to only considered particular attack patterns. The experiment will 
show us that in this particular case, the latter reasoning seems 
most valid.    
We now describe the specific algorithms A1 and A2, as well as 
pseud code describing their operation. Note that some of the 
variable names being used in the pseudo code are given in Table 
1. 
Algorithm 1 (A1): This algorithm is a simple implementation of 
the proposal of [17] where only the first part of the message is 
checked for similar hashes. The pseudo code of this is shown in 
Figure 2. 
Algorithm 2 (A2): This algorithm is similar to A1 except that 
before any calculation of the hash values, the message would go 
through word transformation that would delete all redundant 
letters, white spaces, unify letters case, and transform common 
number shortcuts to their equivalent letters (e.g. 4 would become 
for). Those transformations would create a harder algorithm since 
it would detect any attempt of the attacker to trick the spam filter 
by using those word transformations. The pseudo code of this is 
shown in Figure 3. 
Input:  T: Text of Mail 
           Var h: Hash value 
Output: R: result of detection 
New-Hash-DB-Candidate ← Make N Hash values from T 
For h in New-Hash-DB-Candidate do 
    For each first 25 hash in New-Hash-DB-Candidate do 
      If hi in H1 is similar to hj in H2 
      Then increment similarity, increment j and i=j 
          Else increment j 
          If H1 and H2 share S1 same hash value 
          Then  
   R= detected; 
            Update-Similar-Mail (Mail in Hash-DB pointed         
…………………………….by h) 
   If No. of Similar Mail > D  
   Then Mark Hash-DB as “spam” 
            Else R= no similarity 
 // If No Similar Entry exists in Hash DB 
 Store-New-Mail (New-Hash-DB-Candidate) 
Return R; 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Pseudocode of A1.  
 
. 
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Input:  T: Text of Mail 
            Var h: Hash value 
 Output: R: result of detection 
.// Remove all white spaces; make the whole text 
.lowercase 
.T’ = Normalise (T)    
 //Remove triple letters; convert some numbers to letters  
.(like 4 to for)   
 New-Hash-DB-Candidate ← Make N Hash values from T 
 For h in New-Hash-DB-Candidate do 
      For each first 25 hash in New-Hash-DB-Candidate do 
            If hi in H1 is similar to hj in H2 
            Then increment similarity, increment j and  
..................i=j 
            Else increment j 
            If H1 and H2 share S2 same hash value 
            Then R= detected; 
    Update-Similar-Mail (Mail in Hash-DB pointed 
……….. . . .  by h) 
    If No. of Similar Mail > D  
    Then Mark Hash-DB as “spam” 
             Else R= no similarity 
   // If No Similar Entry exists in Hash DB 
  Store-New-Mail (New-Hash-DB-Candidate) 
 Return R; 
 
 
Without going into too much detail, one can see from Figure 2 
and Figure 3 that the algorithms have significant similarity, with 
A1 using a subset of the rules of A2.  As we explained previously, 
the only differences are processing A2 through a word 
transformation, and decreasing the similarity threshold.   
In our experiments, we use a third algorithm, A3. A3 is similar to 
A1, but does not check the first part of the email, but the last part. 
We ask all participants in both groups to also break A3, after they 
have broken A1 and A2.  The inclusion of this third algorithm at 
the end of both experiments does not affect the results for the first 
two algorithms, as it would not affect the learning cycle on the 
previous two algorithms, but could enable us to gain valuable 
insights for future research.  The first insight would relate to how 
the attacker’s increase in knowledge would affect the speed 
needed to break another related, but not subset, algorithm. The 
second insight would be a step toward proving that the 
deployment of a set of related algorithms, which have slight 
differences, could significantly increase the time needed to break 
the systems’ security.  
Algorithm 3 (A3): This algorithm is also similar to A1 except that 
the hashes are calculated from the last part of the message instead 
of the first part. We therefore do not provide the pseudo code for 
A3 separately; it follows directly from the code for A1 in Figure 
2.   
Table 1. Identifying the symbols and the values 
Symbol Meaning Value 
D Spam threshold  100 
N Number of hash values for each email  100 
S1 Similarity threshold “Algorithm 1” 75% 
S2 Similarity threshold “Algorithm 2” 45% 
 
Briefly, the symbols in Table 1 are explained in the following. As 
in [17], a hash-based vector representation was used. That is, for 
each email, hash values of each length 9 substring are calculated1, 
                                                             
1 We use the standard hash function provided in Java library.   
and then the first N of them are used as vector representation of 
the email. To check a single email, in order to find similar 
previous email which share S% of the same hash values, the 
algorithm checks the database. As a result, an email transferred 
more than D times is marked as spam. 
In each trial of the experiment, the participant sends a batch of 
100 identical messages to the system, i.e. the number of messages 
is fixed. In order to pass the algorithm, each participant should be 
able to get 300 emails accepted by the spam filter.  In our 
experiments, if an email has been sent more than 100 times and 
share 75%, for example in case A1, of their hash values, they 
would be marked as spam. So, if a participant sends the same 
message twice, the system regards it as spam since two hundred 
identical emails being sent.  The participant must thus make 
enough changes to avoid an email being considered spam.  The 
copy and paste functions were not activated to avoid sending 
completely different email, and this will be highlighted in the 
following section. The similarities thresholds were selected 
empirically, based on the results of the pilot study.   
3.1.5 Materials: stimulus and rational  
The stimulus material provided to participants consisted of some 
default email text.  The subjects were asked to send this text to the 
server, as if it was a typical email.  The email text was chosen to 
be 512 characters in length.  Although real-life spammers may 
send messages that are shorter than this, the length of messages 
provides the subjects with sufficient text to utilize a range of 
different strategies to breach the spam-filter. 
The same email text was assigned to all subjects, rather than 
allowing each subject to write his own email. There were several 
reasons for this.  First, self-written emails may be of different 
lengths, making the measurement and comparison of participant’s 
learning a difficult task.  Second, self-written emails might be 
chosen because they are easy to type (or, in perverse cases, 
particularly hard to type).  This would again introduce biases that 
are difficult to control. Third, the use of the same email template 
across all subjects means that each subject can be treated as an 
impostor for all the other subjects, putting testing on a firm 
foundation. Finally, using the same email for everyone affected 
experimental control over unanticipated biases.  
3.2 Experimental Procedure   
In this section, the instructions to subjects, procedures and 
collected data are explained.  
3.2.1 Instructions to Subjects  
As mentioned, subjects were instructed to act as attackers whose 
target is to defeat the spam-filter algorithms by successfully 
passing the spam filter for 3 emails (where each e-mail is 
interpreted as a batch of 100, as we explained above). The 
subjects were instructed that to defeat an algorithm, they should 
introduce enough changes to the provided message template to 
trick the spam filter into thinking that the message being sent is 
genuine. The maximum number of changes they were allowed to 
introduce at each trial was 80. This makes it impossible for 
participants to write a completely different message. Subjects 
were instructed that there are a number of candidate attacks that 
spammers can enact to fool spam filter algorithms. For example 
[5, 31]: Random addition, Thesaurus substitution, Perceptive 
substitution and Aimed addition. Subjects were told that if they 
needed a break; they were to do so after they had defeated all the 
algorithms.  Subjects were able to gauge their progress by looking 
at a counter at the right of the screen which showed how many 
Figure 3. Pseudocode of A2.  
 
. 
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emails had been sent successfully so far and how many yet 
remained. Subjects were admonished to focus on the task and to 
avoid distractions, such as talking with the experimenter, while 
the task was in progress.  
3.2.2 Procedures 
The experiment was conducted in a controlled laboratory 
environment to avoid any distractions, and collect the desired data 
without any biases. As we mentioned, each group had an equal 
number of participants (20). Each participant was offered £5 for 
the participation. To motivate participants to do their best, like 
real attackers, an additional incentive to increase their motivation 
was offered. The participant who got the highest score in each 
group was awarded £40 while the second ranked subject was 
awarded £20. The highest score is based on the time consumed to 
complete the task. 
During the experiment, each participant was given a brief 
introduction to the content-based spam-filter.  Printed information 
was also supplied.  Participants were highly encouraged to ask the 
experimenter any questions especially on how to complete the 
survey at the end of the experiment.  A brief demonstration was 
then provided to participants on how the prototype system works 
was shown to the participants.  This demonstration was performed 
in a uniform manner across all participants.  The participants were 
then allowed to get a brief hands-on experience using the 
prototype system. The experimenter remained seated throughout. 
The details of the experimental task that a participant carried out 
are the following: 
 The participant attempted to defeat the spam-filter by 
sending a default email 900 times. 
 After each sending, the participant progress will be 
given whether s/he passes or fails, and whether the 
currently deployed algorithm of the system has been 
changed or not. 
 Finally, the participant was asked to fill a short survey 
about the previous session.  
At the end of the experiment, each participant was informed about 
the achieved score, the time taken and the number of trials. Each 
participant also had the choice to fill in a short survey about his or 
her experience. 
3.2.3 Collected Data 
The time taken by each participant to defeat the algorithms in 
each session was recorded by the system. Further, the number of 
trials and the emails sent for each session were recorded as well. 
4. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
In the experimental study, all the participants successfully 
completed their task. The details of the overall time needed to 
defeat all algorithms, the significance of the order and how the 
attacking process went through are now presented. 
4.1 Overall Time 
The average time needed to break each algorithm in the two 
groups is shown in Figure 4. Remember from Section 3.1.1 that 
Group 1 starts with trying to break the easier algorithm A1 and 
then the harder algorithm A2, while Group 2 starts with the harder 
algorithm A2, followed by A1. Both groups conclude with 
algorithm A3.    
From the totals (the right most bar), we see that Group 1 took 
longer than Group 2.  This demonstrates there are implications to 
the ordering of the algorithm, as we will discuss in detail in 
Section 4.2.  As expected, the ‘tougher’ algorithm A2 took more 
time to break than A1. In Group 2 it took the longest time, 16.2 
minutes, followed by 14.10 minutes in Group 1. Some other 
results are also as expected. The time needed to break A1 is far 
less in Group 2, because it learns from first breaking A2, which is 
effectively a superset of A1.  Also, the time needed to break A3 
was almost identical in both groups.  
 
 
 
4.2 Order Significance 
In the following, the consequences of changing the order of 
release of the first two algorithms A1 and A2 are presented.  
Table 2 compares with respect to the order of the first two 
algorithms in the two groups, both with respect to time and trials 
needed. In the tables, ‘Avg.’ denotes average and ‘SD’ denotes 
standard deviation of the observations. ‘Max’ and ‘Min’ 
obviously refer to the maximum and minimum of the 
observations.   
The average time needed for breaking A1 and A2 in Group 1 is 
25.0 minutes, and 20.10 minutes in Group 2. A t-test yields a 
result of t=1.89, p<0.1, indicating that the average time needed to 
break the algorithms was significantly longer in Group 1 than in 
Group 2.  
The order of the algorithms did also influence the average number 
of trials as it was 33.4 trials for Group 1 and 26.1 trials for Group 
2. However, this was not to a statistically significant level (t=1.51, 
p=0.143).  
Table 2. Order matters of two algorithms A1 and A2 
Group 
Total time (A1 + A2) Total trials (A1 + A2) 
Avg. SD Max Min Avg. SD Max Min 
1 25.0 10.6 57.1 13.5 33.4 20.1 99.0 14.0 
2 20.1 4.3 26.0 10.8 26.1 8.3 40.0 11.0 
 
We compared A1 in the two groups in Table 3. A t-test yielded a 
result of t=6.33, p<0.001, indicating that the time consumed to 
break A1 in Group 1 was significantly longer than that in Group 
2. Also a statistically significant difference was found in the 
number of trials (t=6.62, p<0.005), showing that the number of 
trials increased correspondingly with the time needed.  
Table 3. Breaking A1 for each group 
Group 
Total time A1  Total trials A1 
Avg. SD Max Min Avg. SD Max Min 
1 10.9 4.7 24.8 5.5 14.8 6.8 31 6 
2 3.8 1.3 6.5 0.86 4.3 1.87 8 2 
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Likewise, we compare A2 in the two groups in Table 4. A t-test 
yields a result of t=-1.32, p<0.196, indicating that the time 
consumed to break A2 in Group 2 was not significantly longer 
than that in Group 1. Moreover, there was not found any 
statistically significant in the number of trials (t=-0.86, p=0.399). 
Table 4. Breaking A2 for each group 
Group 
Total time A2 Total trials A2 
Avg. SD Max Min Avg. SD Max Min 
1 14.1 6.2 32.3 7.8 18.6 14.7 74 8 
2 16.2 3.4 21.3 8.9 21.7 7.2 34 9 
 
By examining Tables 3 and 4, two interesting patterns can be 
observed. First, the attackers gained knowledge after exploiting 
the rules of A2 in Group 2 was almost enough to enable the 
attacker to defeat A1 in no time. That is, the time to break the 
second released algorithm was extensively decreased in Group 2 
compared to Group 1. Second, the attackers gained knowledge 
after exploiting A1 in Group 1 did not contribute much to break 
the tougher next algorithm A2.  
It can also be observed that there is an important variation in the 
time needed to break A1, which constituted 44% of the time in 
Group 1 compared to 19% in Group 2. Also, the time needed to 
break A2 was 56% of the average time in Group 1 compared to 
81% in Group 2. As a consequence, this may imply a direct 
correlation between the order of the algorithms release and  their 
type. 
We examined the third algorithm, which is less related to the 
algorithms A1 and A2, to check whether the algorithm order 
would have any effect on the time needed to defeat it. That is, we 
compared A3 in the two groups in Table 5. A t-test yielded a 
result of t=0.14, p=0.891, indicating that there was no statistically 
significant difference between the times needed to break A3 in 
both Group 1 and Group 2. Moreover, no statistically significant 
difference was found in the number of trials (t=1.12, p=0.273).  
As a result, the order of the preceding algorithms A1 and A2 did 
not influence the learning phase for the non-subset algorithm.  
Table 5. Breaking A3 for each group 
Group 
Total time A3 Total trials A3 
Avg. SD Max Min Avg. SD Max Min 
1 6.70 4.93 17 0.97 8.8 10.3 49 2 
2 6.5 4.4 16.3 0.56 6.05 4.4 20 2 
 
Finally, we compared the influence of ordering for all the 
algorithms in the two groups in Table 6. The average time needed 
for the total of all algorithms in Group 1 was 31.7 minutes 
compared to 26.60 minutes in Group 2. A t-test yielded a result of 
t=1.76, p<0.1, indicating that the time needed to break the 
algorithms in Group 1 was significantly longer than in  Group 2. 
Interestingly, the average number of trials was 42.3 trails in Group 
1 compared to 32.1 trials in Group 2. A t-test yielded a result of 
t=1.78, p<0.1, indicating that the number of trials in Group 1 was 
statistically significantly higher than in Group 2. This is 
surprising, since the time to break A3 differs little between 
groups, and without algorithm A3 there was no statistically 
significant difference between the total number of trials of the two 
groups. This may suggest that with respect to the number of trials 
needed the validity of our hypothesis is at the edge of statistical 
significance. 
Table 6. Breaking all algorithms for each group 
Group 
Total time (A1+A2+A3) Total trials (A1+A2+A3) 
Avg. SD Max Min Avg. SD Max Min 
1 31.7 10.8 59.4 17.4 42.3 23 112 16 
2 26.6 7.36 36.1 12.2 32.1 11 56 13 
 
So, it could be confirmed that concatenating the algorithms (i.e. 
A1 and A2) in either groups with a different algorithm expands 
the time needed to defeat the spam-filter regardless of their release 
order. At the same time, it signifies that once knowledge has been 
gained, the success in breaking other algorithms does not depend 
on how that total amount of knowledge was gained. This is 
perhaps as expected, but it is in fact important in our Markov 
model in Section 5, which by the nature of Markovian processes 
requires such a ‘memory-less’ property. 
4.3 Attacking Process 
Qualitative data were collected, in the form of surveys, to verify 
that the attacking process was accomplished by structured 
strategies that are based on the knowledge gained rather than 
complete randomness. In particular, we were looking for the 
strategies that were used to defeat the algorithms, the part of the 
email that the participants believed that each algorithm was 
checking, and the algorithm which the participants thought was 
the toughest to defeat.  
Most of the participants, 90% (36 out of 40) used structured 
strategies to defeat the algorithms. In particular, 55% (22 out of 
40) used random addition, Thesaurus substitution and perceptive 
substitution, while the remaining 35% (14 out of 40) used 
Thesaurus substitution and other strategies.  
In terms of identifying the correct part of the email that each 
algorithm is checking, the results in Group 1 were 70% (14 out of 
20), 80% (16 out of 20) and 75% (15 out of 20) for A1, A2 and 
A3, respectively. In Group 2, the results were 100% (20 out of 
20), 100% (20 out of 20) and 70% (14 out of 20) for A1, A2 and 
A3, respectively.  Furthermore, we observed that 80% (16 out of 
20) in Group 1 found that the A2 was the hardest algorithm, 
whereas 95% (19 out of 20) found that the A2 was the hardest 
algorithm in Group 2.  
It is worthwhile to note that pervious research assumed, based on 
empirical results, that the attackers’ skills would increase based on 
the knowledge acquired [6]. Our qualitative data appeared to 
confirm this assumption. 
The experiment shows that there is a statistically significant 
difference in the time taken by the two groups to break the 
algorithms.  In other words, the hypothesis (H1) holds that the 
total time for an attack to succeed depends on the order in which 
defensive algorithms are released (or, to be more precise, the 
hypothesis is not rejected).  Given this result, we seek to construct 
a model through which the optimal release strategy for defense 
mechanisms can be derived.  
5. DERIVING OPTIMAL RELEASE 
STRATEGIES 
To determine the optimal release strategies we use a stochastic 
model that takes into account the important aspects of the 
problem.  Broadly, a stochastic model is a model that involves 
probability, or randomness, associated with time and events. 
When using such a model, a stochastic process represents the 
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behavior of the system over time, and given the occurrence of 
certain events.   A stochastic model can be depicted as a state 
transition diagram, which describes all relevant operational 
system states and the possible transitions between these states. To 
describe time aspects between events, a rate matrix is specified.  
One usually assumes that the event that will occur next in the 
system, as well as the time before this event, is random. Hence, 
the behavior of the system is a stochastic process. The main 
advantage of this modeling approach is that it captures dynamic 
aspects of system behavior, which we argue is an applicable 
approach for modeling the security of a system. 
In particular, we will model the problem as a Markov Decision 
Process [3], allowing us to determine an optimal strategy from the 
model. The objective will be to order the release of algorithms 
such as to maximize the time until the attacker breaks through all 
algorithms available. We will show that when maximizing the 
mean time to break the algorithms, well-known iterative 
algorithms [16] can be applied; moreover, the problem is a special 
case of [7]. We will provide a version of such an iterative 
algorithm that exploits the absorbing nature of the underling 
Markov chain and avoids generating (and storing) the whole 
Markov chain.   
5.1 Markov Decision Process 
A decision process is characterized by the fact that in each state 
there is a choice to be made between possible actions. Each action 
takes the process to a new state. For the problem at hand, we 
introduce a continuous time Markov Decision Process defined by 
its states s ∈ S, the possible actions A(s) in any state s, and 
transition delays λa associated with any action a ∈ A(s). If useful, 
we will also use λi,j if the action results in a transition from state i 
to j.  
States in the Markov Decision Process must reflect the amount of 
knowledge gained by the attacker. We make the very natural 
assumption that if a given set of algorithms has been broken, the 
time it takes to break future algorithms is the same regardless of 
the order in which the earlier algorithms were broken. (Our 
experiments showed this a valid assumption, since the time to 
break Algorithm A3 was not influenced by the order in which the 
earlier ones were broken).  Then, the state is completely specified 
by maintaining which algorithms are broken.  If G is the set of all 
algorithms (with |G| elements), then a state s ∈ S is a tuple s = (g-
1,g2,…,g|G|), where gi = 0 if the i-th algorithm has not been broken 
yet, gi = 1 if the i-th algorithm has been broken.  
The actions in a state represent the selection of a next algorithm to 
be released. So, there is an action corresponding to any algorithm 
that is not broken yet, that is, there are as many possible actions in 
state s ∈ S as there are 0 elements.  
The delays signify the time it takes for an attacker to break the 
algorithm associated with action a. This time depends on the 
knowledge gained from breaking earlier algorithms, which is 
maintained in the state.  
This formulation immediately shows that there exist at most 2 |G| 
states. The possible order in which the |G| algorithms can be 
released is |G|!. To determine which release order is optimal, we 
first need to define the optimization criterion. For that 
optimization criterion, we then require a reasonably efficient 
algorithm to search through the many options.  
The metric of interest (and, hence, the optimization criterion) in 
our work is to maximize the time it takes to break all algorithms. 
So, let the stochastic process R(t), defined for t ≥ 0, indicate if all 
algorithms have been broken at time t: R(t) = 1 if s = (1,1,…,1) 
and otherwise R(t) = 0. Note that R(t) turns 1 only once, and then 
stays 1. The probability that all algorithms are broken at time t is 
P(R(t) = 1), where P indicates the probability, as usual. R(t) also 
provides us with the mean time to security failure (MTTSF [15]): 
E[R(t)] =            
 
 
, and with higher moments similarly. In 
what follows, we refer to R(t) as the time to security failure.  
Finding the best strategy corresponds to a standard Markov 
Decision Process optimization problem with finite horizon only 
for the first moment E[R(t)], but not for higher moments or its 
distribution. We will also present a specific backward algorithm 
that efficiently generates all paths ‘backwards’ from the state that 
all algorithms have been broken 
5.2 Optimization Algorithm 
To calculate the optimal strategy, it is useful to realize that any 
selected sequence of algorithms corresponds to a hypo-
exponential distribution, which in turn is a special case of a Phase-
Type distribution [11]. We now need the following result for 
hypo-exponential distributions:  
If H1 is hypo-exponential with rates λ1,…,λK and MTTSF 
E[R1(t)], and H0 is hypo-exponential with rates λ0, λ1,…,λK, and 
MTTSF E[R0(t)], then E[R0(t)] = 1/λ0 + E[R1(t)].  
This is an obvious result, but it is important to note that the same 
does not hold for higher moments. The above implies that we can 
execute a backward algorithm that optimizes for hypo-exponential 
distributions of increasing length. It also implies that we can use 
known Markov Decision Process theory, since we can associate 
reward ri,j = 1/ λi,j with each transition from state i to j. The 
association of rewards completes the formal definition of a 
Markov Decision Process.  
Because of the specific structure of our model, it makes sense to 
provide a bespoke algorithm that avoids generating the complete 
state space as shown in Figure 5. Note that (1,1,…,1) is the 
absorbing state with all algorithms broken. The algorithm starts 
from that absorbing state and explores all possible previous states 
(stored in ToDoSet). For each previous state it selects the action 
that maximizes the time to reach the absorbing state (stored in the 
BestNext variable associated with each state).  This continues 
until the state with no broken algorithms is reached. 
start = (0,0,…,0); 
end = (1,1,…,1); 
For All s ∈ S set ETs = 0;  
ToDoSet = {end}; 
While( ToDoSet ≠ {start} ) Do { 
   ToDoSet = {s|si, for any i  ToDoSet} 
   For All s  ToDoSet Do { 
      For All i ∈ S such that s  i Do { 
         If( 1/λs,i + ETi > ETs ) Then { 
            ETs = 1/λs,i + ETi; 
            BestNexts = i; 
         }       
      } 
   } 
} 
 
 Figure 5. The backward optimization algorithm 
 
. 
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The optimal order of releasing the algorithms is then obtained as 
follows, in the tuple Optimal: 
s = start; 
Optimal = (s); 
While( s ≠ end ) Do { 
   Optimal = (Optimal, BestNexts ); 
   s = BestNexts; 
} 
 
We note that the algorithm above does not generate the complete 
state space S, nor all possible sequences of algorithms. The 
storage required is about N!/[(N/2)!(N/2)!] real-valued variables, 
which occurs halfway the backward algorithm (which starts with a 
single state (end) and ends with a single state (start)). That 
still limits the size of the model one will be able to solve, but with 
modern day computing equipment this implies that the problem 
can be solved for up to several tens of algorithms.  
It is important to note that the above algorithm does not work if 
higher moments are considered. Moreover, it is also 
straightforward to find release strategies that optimize the 
MTTSF, but not optimize the second moment of the time until 
security failure.  
5.3 Application to the Example 
Our example with the three algorithms is of course a simple case, 
in that it has only few states, and the best release strategy can 
therefore be easily computed.  Nevertheless, it is useful to provide 
the Markov Decision Process for this case, as we do in Figure 6.  
 
 
 
 
In our example there are three algorithms, (A1, A2, A3), leading 
to 8 theoretically possible states (denoted by the circles in Figure 
6), but in our example we restrict the possible order and always 
put algorithm A3 last. The actions in each state are given by the 
arcs. Only in state (0,0,0) there is a choice between actions, 
namely to first release algorithm A1 (leading to (1,0,0)) or to first 
release algorithm A2 (leading to 0,1,0). The arcs are labeled by 
the time it takes to complete breaking the algorithm, as seen from 
our experiment. Referring back to Section 4, Group 1 followed the 
trajectory at the top of Figure 6, using 10.9 minutes to break A1 
and 14.1 to break A2. Group 2 followed the trajectory at the 
bottom of Figure 6, using 16.2 minutes to break A2 and 3.8 
minutes to break A1. Then all participants broke A3, in an 
average of 6.6 minutes.  
The backward optimization algorithm of Figure 5 would traverse 
backward and pick the best action. Before getting to state (0,0,0), 
it would have obtained intermediate results of 14.1 + 6.6 = 20.7 
for state (1,0,0) and 3.8 + 6.6 = 10.4 for state (0,1,0). For state 
(0,0,0) it then selects the action that maximizes the time to 
security failure, so it would release algorithm A1 first (the 
trajectory at the top of Figure 6), because 10.9 + 20.7 > 16.2 + 
10.4.  So, the optimal release strategy becomes A1 followed by 
A2 followed by A3. 
6. DISCUSSION 
Our experimental and theoretical study confirms that optimizing 
the release order for the same set of algorithms can increase the 
time needed to break a system’s security in a statistically 
significant manner.  
In particular, as shown in Table 2, the time and number of trials 
that were required to break the system in Group 1 were more on 
average compared to Group 2.  We remind the reader that 
algorithm A1 is a subset of A2, which implies that when A2 is 
broken, the same technique would break A1.  For this particular 
experiment, we can conclude that the success of attacks can be 
delayed by breaking up an algorithm in parts that are released in 
sequence.  We have to be careful not to generalize that conclusion 
too quickly, but it is an interesting insight that would imply that 
the intuitive reasoning that by breaking up an algorithm in subsets 
you `teach’ the attacker how to attack is less valid.    
Furthermore, based on the qualitative data, we found that the 
participants performed the attacking process by strategies using 
skills gained. Among such wrongful direction is the believing that 
the algorithm is checking a different part of the email. In contrast 
to our results, a study in [29] shown that the low-variance 
condition group performed better than high-variance condition 
group with regards to accuracy. However, they did not evaluate 
whether or not the order of low/high-variance can be performed 
differently.  
The concatenation of A3 at the end of both Group 1 and Group 2 
yielded an interesting and important result. It showed that despite 
the knowledge gain at any point of the release chain, injecting a 
non-subset algorithm would force the attacker back to the learning 
phase. It is still true that the time needed to learn was identical in 
both groups and less than the first learning phase.  We also note 
that we used the insight that breaking A3 takes an equal amount of 
time for both group as a confirmation that a Markov model is an 
appropriate formalism for the problem at hand.  
The results obtained in this paper are very encouraging. They 
indicate that the order in which defensive algorithms are released 
matter for the example and may therefore matter in various 
settings. Hence, optimizing the release order of defensive 
algorithms is a problem worthwhile to be studied.  The results in 
this paper are a first step, showing the validity of the problem and 
providing insights in where to invest future research.  
7. RELATED WORK  
A considerable number of studies have been conducted by 
researchers to investigate the protection of systems from attacks 
by automated software that degrade their quality of service due to 
resource expenditure.   
Attack Modelling: A quantitative analysis of attacker behaviour 
based on empirical data collected from intrusion experiments was 
presented in [6].  Beside this, [12] has described a technique for 
transforming a privilege graph into a Markov chain.  The states of 
Figure 6. Markov Decision Process for Example 
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the resulting Markov chain denote the enhanced privileges gained 
by an attacker as a result of series of atomic attacks on a system..  
Furthermore, generic models have been developed that focus on 
evaluating security and allow the analysis of the security of 
systems capable of detecting and responding to attacks [8, 1].  In 
relation to the time taken for an attacker to compromise a system 
and misuse its resources, [9, 10, 28, 32] have proposed a model 
for estimating the time to compromise a system component that is 
visible to an attacker. Additionally, [10] suggested the attacker 
skill levels should be consideration when determining the mean 
time to compromise a system [9]. The studies listed above suggest 
that stochastic modelling can be a suitable approach to the 
modelling of attacks on a system, and quantifying the efficacy of 
security measures. While a number of the above methods and 
techniques seem promising, none of them could provide a 
quantitative measure of maximising the time needed to defeat a 
system that was considered for the proposed approach. 
Game theoretic Security Approaches. Game theory has been a 
mainstream research topic in the economic community. A 
comprehensive introduction to the area is in [22]. Applied 
economics concepts have been applied to computer security to 
address the analysis of strategic choices that enterprises will take 
regarding to maintenance and management under an assumed 
cost. As game theory views the interactions between an attacker 
and the administrator as a two-player, it can provide a 
mathematical framework for analyzing and modeling network 
security problem. As indicated in [33], most of the current games 
theoretic are based on static game, games with perfect information 
or games with complete information.  
In the traditional network security solutions, one of the first 
approaches for applying game theory to network security is 
discussed in [20]. They used a Markovian decision process and 
one player game to detect, reason, and respond to automated 
attack behavior in information assurance systems. Furthermore, 
Lye and Wing [25] model the interaction between an attacker and 
a defender as a two-player stochastic game. In P2P Session 
Initiation Protocol infrastructure, game theory is used to 
understand and better defend against blocking and flooding 
attacks against [19].  
As a dynamic game, the problem of Nash Equilibrium Design for 
quite a general class of games from an optimization and control 
theoretic perspective investigated by Alpcan et al. [18]. They 
focused on how long does the game approach Nash equilibrium 
when many players are trying to solve it in a distributed way. A 
feedback system approach is suggested as a control input to make 
the system robust and to control the system’s progress. [26] 
utilized Min-max Q learning approach to aid in the gradual 
improvement of the defender’s quality. This work can handle 
reactive defense actions, while in [27] they proposed proactive 
defense measures. In [23], the interaction of an attacker and the 
network administrator as a repeated game modeled with finite 
steps or infinite steps. Moreover, a model for evaluating the 
plausibility of successful attack on a given network with 
interdependent files and services has presented in [24]. In 
addition, a study by [34] focused on active defense using an 
approach to attack prediction. Furthermore, a game theory 
approach has been adapted to attack modelling as a means for 
computing and therefore predicting the expected attacker strategy 
[13, 14].   
Indeed, although a number of current models involving dynamic 
games with incomplete and imperfect information exist, they are 
focused on different application areas, especially wireless network 
whereas a few others did not consider a realistic attack scenario. 
More importantly, none of them considers learning and/or 
maximizing the duration of the game as the game’s objective.  
Effects of information order. The idea that the order in which 
information is received could affect both the learning process and 
the ultimate knowledge representation is of course commonly 
studied in the fields such as education or psychology. General 
learning theories, such as Rumelhart and Normans [30], model of 
accretion, tuning and restructuring. For example, an empirical 
non-linguistic experiment by [29] evaluated the effects of 
information order and variance on schema abstraction. This 
research shown that the low-variance condition group performed 
better with regards to typicality ratings and accuracy than high-
variance condition. Our focus on attackers and defensive 
algorithms is clearly different, but when studying the learning 
process of attackers in more detail, undoubtedly lessons can be 
learnt from [30] and other literature in the field of education. 
8. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
This paper introduces the problem of scheduling the release of 
defensive algorithms so as to prolong the time attackers need to 
successfully defeat all algorithms.  Our work is based on the 
observation that attackers increase knowledge by learning from 
their attempted attacks, and on the intuition that the learning 
experience of attackers can be influenced by the order in which 
defensive algorithms are released.   
Through an experiment with simplified but representative spam 
filter algorithms we were able to show that the order in which 
defensive algorithms are released indeed influences the time 
attacks take.  This is a very encouraging result for this line of 
research, indicating that the problem merits study.  The 
experiment also provides an indication that breaking up a 
defensive algorithm can be a beneficial tool in prolonging the 
overall attack time, but this issue need to be researched in much 
more detail before this conclusion can be drawn more widely.  
The paper also provided a general approach to compute the 
optimal release strategy for defensive algorithms. We 
mathematically model the problem as a Markov Decision Process 
and provide a tailored algorithm to efficiently solve any model 
within the class of models presented.  The model solution should 
scale without problems to optimize the release order of tens of 
defensive algorithms.  
A number of potential issues for future research follow from our 
research. Some of the challenges are of technical nature, but the 
largest challenge may lie in gaining a deeper understanding of the 
way attackers collect knowledge (i.e., in the way they learn).  That 
would allow us to better estimate the time it takes to break a 
defensive algorithm under various levels of knowledge gained, 
and would allow us to determine an optimal strategy without 
conducting the time-consuming experiments carried out in this 
paper. Other fields, such as education and psychology, may 
provide a basis for such research. Similarly, it will be of interest to 
investigate deeper if breaking up defensive algorithms in ‘subsets’ 
indeed increases the speed at which attackers gain knowledge, as 
we found in the our experiments. We look forward to investigate 
such problems further. 
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